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Abstract—Internet is ubiquitous, and in recent times its 
growth has been exponential. This rapid growth caused the 
depletion of the current Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) 
address, prompting IETF with the design of the new Internet 
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) in the 1990’s. IPv6 is the next 
generation of the Internet Protocol designed with much larger 
address space and additional functions to ease its use for the 
users. One of the new functions is address auto configuration of 
new host’s via Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). However, the 
implementation of NDP is not without risk in terms of security. 
This paper analyzes the risk of NDP implementation in public 
network. The result shows a number of risks that appear on the 
implementation of NDP over a Public Network. Neighbors cannot 
be trusted 100%. One of them could be an attacker who may 
exploit the NDP message to get their own benefit. In addition the 
number of insiders increases time to time.   
Keywords—ipv6; neighbor discovery; IPv6 address; security; 
public network 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, Internet connection is available anywhere, any time 
and possibly in everything. People now think about Internet of 
Everything [1] to mean everything in the world could get IP 
address. The growth of Internet users had reached 566.4% in 
2012 [2]. A person nowadays may use more than one device 
connected to the internet such as laptop, smart phone, tablet, 
etc. Exponential growth of the Internet and has caused the 
depletion of Internet addresses [2]. The current Internet 
Protocol, IPv4, has 32 bits of IP address space which is 
equivalent to about 4.3 billion Internet addresses. Although it 
seems like a big number, it is much smaller than the latest 
world population that reaches more than seven billion in 2014. 
To solve the IP address depletion problem, researchers 
proposed a new IP protocol with larger address space which is 
now called Internet Protocol Version Six (IPv6). IPv6 uses 128 
bits address space which can spare millions of IP addresses for 
every millimeter square of earth surface [3]. There are other 
solutions such as Network Address Translation (NAT) [4] as 
well as CIDR (Classless Inter-Domain Routing) [5]. However, 
these mechanisms are temporary measure and only suited for a 
limited time.  
Other than offering larger address space, the new protocol 
also has other advantages including simpler header format, 
extension header for extensibility as well as address auto 
configuration. The address auto configuration is defined by 
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [6]. There are two types 
of address auto configuration – stateless address auto 
configuration [7]  and stateful address auto configuration that 
uses Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [8]. Both 
addressing types rely on NDP message exchange. NDP in IPv6 
borrows concepts from a number of protocols in IPv4 including 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Reverse Address 
Resolution Protocol (RARP), Router Discovery and Redirect 
protocol.  
New technology often comes with both advantages and 
disadvantages. The NDP facilitates new local IPv6 hosts to 
obtain IPv6 address which is required before it can 
communicate with other nodes whether on the same link or 
external link. The original specification of NDP does not 
include any security mechanism possibly on the assumption 
that the neighbors on a local network are trustworthy, which 
not necessarily be. This would cause the local IPv6 
communication to be vulnerable to malicious activities from 
neighbors. Attackers connected to the same link could 
manipulate the NDP message to do malicious activities 
targeting other local nodes. 
Considering the important role of NDP in IPv6 link local 
communication, a survey on the security vulnerability was 
done in [9]. The paper showed a number of threats on IPv6 link 
local communication including Router Advertisements (RA) 
spoofing, RA flooding, Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) 
failure etc. It also discussed a number of proposed solutions to 
secure the NDP such as Secure Neighbor Discovery [10] and 
RA Guard [11]. However, the paper does not consider the real 
network condition that prompted attackers to do malicious 
activities using NDP messages. Attacking activities could be 
perpetrated due to the existence of opportunity or with 
malicious intent. This paper analyzes the current 
implementation of IPv6 NDP in dual stack environment on a 
public network that provides chances as well as attracting 
people to commit malicious activities.  
The rest of this paper consists of overview of IPv6 neighbor 
discovery in Section 2 followed by analysis of methodology in 
Proceeding of International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Informatics (EECSI 2014), Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 20-21 August 2014
275
Section 3. Section 4 provides experimental results and also 
discussion of the implementation of NDP protocol in terms of 
security risk. The last section is the conclusion of the paper.      
II. OVERVIEW OF IPV6 NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY 
Neighbor Discovery is a concept of neighboring nodes 
communication that is usually implemented in wireless 
environment such as in wireless sensor network [12] and 
wireless ad hoc network [13]. In the Internet Protocol, this 
approach is new and was not used in IPv4. This is why NDP is 
considered as as one of the IPv6 advantages. The NDP 
concept specified for IPv6 was standardized in RFC 2461 [14] 
and updated in RFC 4861 [6]. NDP is a layer 3 protocol that 
supports the operation of IPv6 as the main protocol for 
Internet communication.   
NDP works on top of Internet Control Message Protocol 
version 6 (ICMPv6) protocol messages. It uses up to five 
ICMPv6 messages to solve a number of problem regarding the 
interaction between neighboring nodes in the same link. The 
interaction could be divided into two categories: host-to-router 
communication and host-to-host communication. The five 
messages are Router Solicitation (RS), Router Advertisement 
(RA), Neighbor Solicitation (NS), Neighbor Advertisement 
(NA) and Redirect message.  
A. Host- to- Router Communication 
In an IPv6 network, there are two types of nodes – host and 
router. Host is an IPv6 node that is not a router. Router in this 
case is an edge router connected directly to the internal host(s) 
and at the same time connected to the Internet cloud externally. 
It acts as a border gateway between local network and external 
network. It would forward IPv6 packets from and to the host(s) 
in the local network. Prior to performing this function, the 
access router first has to communicate with the member host in 
local network. The communication is done using NDP 
protocol. There are at least five processes on the host-to-router 
communication including router discovery, prefix discovery, 
parameter discovery, address auto configuration as well as 
redirect. 
Router discovery process could also be combined with 
prefix discovery and parameter discovery. It is conducted by 
exchanging a pair of NDP message, Router Solicitation (RS) 
and Router Advertisement (RA). We provided the router 
discovery discussion in [15]. Prefix discovery is a process to 
generate IPv6 address in the host. The router sends RA 
message containing one or more of five NDP options including 
MTU information, prefix information and link layer address of 
the router. Upon getting the RA message, the host configures 
itself by generating IPv6 address based on the received prefix 
information, sets the packet size based on the MTU 
information as well as stores the link layer of router in its 
neighbor cache. 
Router Discovery is very important in the operation of IPv6 
protocol in a network. This is used by an IPv6 host not only to 
discover routers in the same link but also to get link parameter 
and network parameter. Using this mechanism, an IPv6 host 
could generate IPv6 address which is needed to communicate 
with the outside world. Failure to generate an IP address would 
break the communication for the host. Thus, it is clear why we 
cannot simply block or disable ICMPv6 message in IPv6 
environment.     
B. Host to Host Communication 
Host is defined as an IPv6 node that is not a router but, such 
as PC, laptop and hand phone [16]. To get IPv6 address, a host 
must communicate with the router using the router discovery 
mechanism. However, an IPv6 host also needs to communicate 
with other IPv6 host in the same network to get neighbor status 
information. This includes address resolution, next-hop 
determination, neighbor unreachability detection and duplicate 
address detection.  
Address resolution is done to know link layer address of 
neighboring nodes. This is because an IPv6 node cannot 
communicate with other nodes in the same link with knowing 
only its IPv6 address. A node also needs link layer address or 
MAC address of corresponding nodes. This can be done by 
using address resolution mechanism. In IPv4, this mechanism 
is handled by address resolution protocol (ARP) [17]. ARP 
uses broadcast delivery method that sends ARP messages to all 
hosts in a local area network including computer, printer and 
scanner. This would potentially have effect on non related 
nodes in the network. IPv6 limits the number of receiving hosts 
by using the concept of multicast group of node as well as 
solicited node multicast address. Further, only certain node will 
receive NDP message [18]. 
Next-hop determination is a mechanism to determine the 
status of on-link neighbor to which an IPv6 packet to be sent. 
This is required to map destination IP address into neighboring 
node IP address. If the destination is on-link nodes, it requires 
MAC address of the destination. Otherwise, if the destination is 
a node outside the network, the sender will send the packet to 
the border router. Neighbor unreachability detection is a 
mechanism to track the status of reachability of neighboring 
node. An unreachable node could not receive any message. By 
knowing a neighbor’s status, a sender host can determine how 
and where to send its packet.  
IP address should be unique. In order to ensure each 
generated IPv6 address is unique, duplicate address detection 
mechanism is introduced. After a new host received the prefix 
information from default router, it would generate a tentative 
IPv6 address. It then sends a message to multicast group of 
nodes to confirm whether the tentative address is unique. If 
there is no response, it means the address is not in used. 
Otherwise, it will generate a new tentative IPv6 address and 
repeat the duplicate address detection procedure again. All the 
host-to-host communication is done by exchanging a pair of 
NDP messages, Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor 
Advertisement (NA). 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Current implementation of IPv6 is done in dual stack mode 
as most Internet infrastructure is still dependent on IPv4. 
Currently, all recently produced networking devices as well as 
operating system have already supported IPv6 protocol beside 
IPv4. This study was conducted in the dual stack environment 
both for wired and wireless in National Advanced IPv6 Centre, 
Universiti Sains Malaysia. We captured the network traffic in 
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the lab in order to get sample of IPv6 traffic from and to local 
host in the lab. 
The captured traffic is then classified as IPv4 traffic or IPv6 
traffic. The latter were further classified into neighbor 
discovery traffic to identify the router discovery and neighbor 
discovery message. The NDP packet is observed in order to 
understand the behavior of the traffic as well as the possibility 
for it to be exploited.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Topology on the Experimentation 
 
Figure 1 is a topology of the experiment to observe the 
exploitation of RA message used to attack an observed host on 
wireless link. There are five nodes in the setup - an access 
router, a switch, an existing host, an observed host and an 
attacker. The nodes were connected directly via a layer two 
switch. The attacker captured all communication messages 
between router and existing host as well as observed host. 
Afterward, the attacker exploits the RA message to attack the 
observed host.  
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The experiments were done to get sample of Internet traffic 
in NAv6 computer lab. As the lab network is a dual stack IPv4 
and IPv6 network, each connected nodes supporting dual stack 
will have at least one IPv4 address and a minimum of two IPv6 
addresses. Figure 2 shows an example of IP configuration on 
one of the hosts. Host’s IPv4 address is 10.207.161.163 and its 
IPv6 address is 2404:a8:400:1600:2429:9f06:97e3:4450, 
2404:a8:400:1600:a0cb:d19:af09:db and fe80::2429:9f06:97e3: 
4450%12. The host has three IPv6 address generated by the 
host itself with prefix from the access router. The gateway is 
10.207.160.1 for IPv4 link and for IPv6, fe80::c262:6bff:fee2: 
2640%12. The IPv6 address of the gateway is a link local 
address of the default router connected to the host. The ‘%’ is 
to identify the interface used to communicate with neighboring 
node. 
As shown in the Figure 2, the host under observation is 
connected using wireless adapter. The host can be relocated 
from one network to another. It is also usable in public area 
such as at airport, coffee shop as well as office BYOD. In a 
period of 13.5 minutes, we managed to capture 11,860 IP 
packets in various format and protocol as summarized in 
Figure 3. The displayed traffic shown in Figure 3 is the total 
number of IPv6 packets that were captured.  Only 226 packets 
or 2% of the total number of packets captured were IPv6 
packets. This is because almost all Internet infrastructures are 
still using IPv4. IPv6 packets could also be sent through the 
network using tunneling mode that will be categorized as IPv4 
packet by packet capture applications. In addition, most of 
accessed website is still using IPv4.     
Figure 2. IP Configuration in Observed Host 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Summary of Captured IP Packet 
 
The more important aspect is the kind of IPv6 packet 
captured in the observation. 167 packets out of 266 IPv6 
packets, which is equivalent to 74%, are ICMPv6 packets. 
Then, out of the 167 ICMPv6 packets, 140 or 84% of it are 
neighbor discovery message. This means communication 
between IPv6 nodes in local network are dominated by the 
NDP messages. This is happening behind the scene without 
the user’s knowledge or intervention. In addition, this will be 
done dynamically and continuously as long as there is host 
connected in the IPv6 local network. This is the nature of NDP 
mechanism in an IPv6 network. 
Even when there is no IPv6 traffic flowing from and to 
external network (Internet cloud), the local IPv6 traffic will 
still be present. Neighbor discovery message is exchanged by 
IPv6 nodes inside a local network itself. This would be done 
automatically if the host has support for IPv6 protocol. 
However, for majority of newer devices, the IPv6 protocol 
support is configured to run immediately when the devices 
start up.  
The NDP messages captured during the experimentation 
could be classified into two: host-to-router communication and 
host-to-host communication. The first is shown by the router 
discovery message including RS and RA. However, due to the 
observed host has already gotten the IPv6 address (Figure 2), 
there is no RS message. RS message is sent by host requesting 
router information. Router will reply by sending RA message. 
Access Router 
(AR) 
Existing Host  
Observed Host 
Attacker 
Existing Host  
Switch (SW) 
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However, the router also sends RA message periodically. 
When a new host has already configured an IPv6 address and 
discovered on link, it will not send RS message anymore.  
While the host-to-host communication consist of both NS 
and NA message as communication between hosts in the local 
network. NS is sent to request any information including link 
layer address, uniqueness address confirmation as well as 
neighbor unreachability status. The captured IPv6 packets 
could be classified as in Figure 4.    
 
 
 
Figure 4. IPv6 Packet Classification 
 
Figure 5. Router Advertisement Message 
 
The result presented in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 
clearly show NDP messages were exchanged between IPv6 
nodes in the local area network. This process is hidden from 
the view of users. In addition, most Internet users are 
oblivious to the version of Internet Protocol they are 
connected to. Their only concern is about getting internet 
connectivity regardless of which Internet Protocol their 
network is using.  
In a public network, everybody could use the available 
Internet connection to do anything including malicious 
activities. An attacker usually needs other node IP address to 
direct their attacking activities. They usually perform scanning 
on the network to obtain other node address. In IPv6 
environment, there is no need for network scanning at all to 
discover the network. They just need to capture the NDP 
message transmitted from and to other nodes in the local 
network they are attached to. They can get all IP addresses as 
well as MAC addresses of other nodes in the same link. 
The NDP message could be exploited to do harmful 
activities as summarized in [19]. In this paper we just show 
result of experimentation on the exploitation on RA message 
as in Figure 5. Attacker could use the message to perform a 
number of malicious activities such as RA spoofing, RA 
flooding, kills the default router, rogue router, etc. All host in 
the network usually connected to a default gateway or default 
router. This means the host will get RA message from the 
router when they connect to the network. Currently most of 
recently manufactured network devices have built-in support 
for IPv6. Therefore, we cannot avoid the automatic 
communication between hosts in IPv6 connection even though 
the local network does not connect to external IPv6 network. 
 
Figure 6. Default Gateway before Attack 
 
Attacker in Figure 1 captured RA message sent from the 
access router to observed host. After learning the RA message 
content, changes were made to the message prior to resending 
the forge message using the same source address. For 
example, the attacker could replace the default router 
information with its own information. The IPv6 address of the 
node before the successful attack is shown in Figure 6. The 
default gateway is fe80::c800:aff:fe8c:8%4. The attacker 
manipulates the RA message and resends to observed host. 
The observed host receives the message then updates its cache 
table including the default router information. The new default 
router, pointing to the attacker’s machine, is put on the top of 
the list as shown in Figure 7. When the victim wants to send 
any packet through a router, the packet will be sent to the 
attacker instead of to the legitimate access router. Thus, the 
packet will not reach the destination.  
Figure 7. Node A after Attack 
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In terms of fake prefix information, Figure 7 also shows 
that the observed host has two different global prefixes. One 
prefix came from a legitimate access router and the other one 
from the attacker. We can see that the legitimate default 
gateway appears at the bottom of the list. The attacker could 
also perform RA flooding attack by sending thousands of RA 
messages with different prefixes information. If so, the 
observed host will receive many prefixes and thus generate 
many different IPv6 addresses.  
V. CONCLUSION 
IPv6 is the successor of the current Internet Protocol that 
has depleted its address space. The new protocol was designed 
with a number of advantages including the NDP as supporting 
component in IPv6 operation. However, the protocol does not 
have any built-in security mechanism. Therefore, the 
implementation of NDP is vulnerable to local threats using 
NDP message exploitation.  
This paper presented the risks on the implementation of 
NDP protocol on IPv6 network. Since the use of IPv6 is a 
necessity in internet environment, disabling or disconnecting 
IPv6 network is not an option. Therefore, a security 
mechanism must be in place to avoid compromise and exploits 
of the protocol in the future. Even though there has been a 
number of security mechanisms proposed such as SeND and 
RA Guard, their use is very much limited, thus NDP still 
remain vulnerable. 
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